Abstract: Fault attack is a very effective way to crack the key for cipher chip. Among existing fault attack countermeasures, the infection countermeasures are very effective means, but, most existing infection countermeasures are based on the single fault assumption, and the accuracy of fault injections has significantly improved in the late years, it has become possible to implementation of double fault attacks in specific circuit regions, and it is, therefore, flawed in the resistance to double fault attacks. Aim at the flawed mentioned, this paper proposes a countermeasure called random infection mechanism to resist fault attacks. We use the encryption/decryption circuit to construct the fault diffusion pattern and avoid under the possibility of double error attacks. Furthermore, in order to against single byte fault attacks, we introduce random numbers to make the fault diffusion randomization. Experiments are carried out to verify the proposed algorithm and the results show that the proposed random infection mechanism can resist fault attacks effectively including single byte error attacks.
Introduction
Fault attacks, as one kind of physical attacks, have drawn much attention since being proposed by Kocher et al., and posed serious threats to embedded devices. When attacking on a block cipher, the fault attacks are usually mentioned as differential fault attacks (DFAs) [1] . The advanced encryption standard (AES), which replaces the data encryption standard (DES) for symmetric key encryption, as its popularity and status as a representative block cipher, has became the main target of DFAs [2, 3] .
To resist fault attacks, effective countermeasures are required. In here, we focus our discussion on AES, for which many countermeasures have been suggested. These countermeasures mainly can be divided into two classes: the ones based on detection [3, 4] . Detection countermeasures aim to determine whether or not there is a fault occurred by comparing the results of the two operation through duplication or multiplex techniques for some computing, modules, or the whole algorithm [4] . If an error is detected, the algorithm does not output the faulty ciphertext, so preventing its exploitation. But as the detection position is related to the data being processed [5] , the comparison step itself is prone to fault attacks. The other ones based on infection [6, 7] . The idea of infection countermeasures is to make faulty ciphertexts unexploitable by diffusing the effect of a fault. But the paper [7] have pointed out only using infection mechanism without introducing the idea of randomization was not enough to resist fault attacks. In 2012, Gierlichs et al. [8] proposed an infection countermeasure using of dummy rounds and redundant computation with consistency checks to prevent fault attacks. The paper [5] pronounced due to the infection process using the same unknown mask, so the infection countermeasure in [8] was insufficient, and made an improvement for it.
Unfortunately, most existing countermeasures are very difficult to defense double fault attacks which can bypass the existing infection mechanisms [4, 7] . This is because the most commonly used infection mechanisms are based on the assumption of the signal fault [4, 5, 7] . What is worse, with the significantly improving accuracy of fault injections in recent years, it has become possible to carry on double fault attacks at a certain time [9, 10] .
To overcome the drawbacks in the above works, this paper presents a novel framework for infection mechanism called random infection mechanism to resist fault attacks based on the research of [4] and [6] . We use the encryption/decryption circuit to construct the fault diffusion pattern, so it could avoid under the possibility of double error attacks. Furthermore, we design a random diffusion function using random numbers to copy with the possible single byte fault attacks. To verify the proposed countermeasure, several experiments are made and the results show our countermeasure can prevent fault attacks effectively.
The proposed random infection countermeasure
Double fault attacks [9, 10] , require the attacker clear the difference of data between two encrypted paths during injecting errors. Since our infection countermeasure applies not the two encrypted paths, but the encryption/decryption circuit, so it can avoid suffer double error attacks.
The principle of our infection countermeasure
In order to resist fault attacks, we use encryption/decryption circuit to construct the fault diffusion pattern, which will make our infection mechanism could not be bypassed and the faulty ciphertexts could not be used to recover the keys. The structure of our infection countermeasure is shown in Fig. 1 .
As illustrated in Fig. 1 , there are two circuit paths: encryption path and decryption path. For AES-128 circuit, only faults occurring in the last few rounds can be exploited in a DFA, i.e. after fifth round [11] , so our decryption round only need contain four rounds, and if carrying out fault attack in the tenth round of the encryption circuit, the position of fault injected must be before SubBytes (SB) [11] , therefore, we carry out decryption operation after SB, and the initial round of the decryption round only includes Inverse SubBytes (ISB). State matrix S 1 is the output of FIFO1 (FIFO1 is a first-in first-out register, as well as FIFO2), and the input of FIFO1 is the output of sixth round for encryption circuit (Rd6). State matrix S 2 is the output of forth round for decryption circuit (IRd4). Δ is the difference between S 1 and S 2 . DðÞ is the diffusion function, which being used to perform the diffusion of the faults, that is À ¼ DðÁÞ, and re-injected in the State matrix after SB of tenth round for encryption circuit, we assume this State matrix is represented as S, so S ¼ S È À, in here, the diffusion function DðÞ must meet Dð0Þ ¼ 0.
For simplicity, we discuss the following conditions separately. Firstly, we assume no fault attack, then S 1 is equal to S 2 , so Á ¼ S 1 È S 2 ¼ 0, and S ¼ S È À ¼ S È DðÁÞ ¼ S È Dð0Þ ¼ S, finally, the encryption circuit outputs the right ciphertext C. That is, when there is no error injection, our circuit outputs the normal data.
Secondly, we assume only injecting fault during one execution into encryption path or decryption path. There is divided into three situations.
1 The fault injection occurred in the decryption path. It is clear that no matter where the error occurred, there is S 1 ≠ S 2 , so À ¼ DðÁÞ ≠ 0, this means, in this situation, the diffusion function effectively plays the role of fault diffusion and the fault attacks could not bypass our infection mechanism. 2 The fault injection occurred in the encryption path and the position of injection is before seventh round, in this situation, S 1 ¼ S 2 , À ¼ DðÁÞ ¼ 0, and the fault attacks can bypass our infection mechanism, but due to the position of injection is less the limit of fault depth, and the diffusion effect of the cryptographic algorithm itself, the attacker still can not break the keys. 3 The fault injection occurred in the encryption path and the position of injection is after seventh round or seventh round, in this situation, no matter where the error occurred, through the operation of decryption round, there must be S 1 ≠ S 2 , so À ¼ DðÁÞ ≠ 0, and our infection mechanism can diffuse the fault effectively. Thirdly, we take into account an extreme case, that is, we assume injecting two same specified faults during one execution into the encryption path and decryption path. In this case, we can easily come to the conclusion that the influence of injected faults is as same as Secondly condition which we have discussed.
Randomization of diffusion function
In [12] , a diffusion function DðÞ is proposed such as the expression (1), denoting 4 Â 4 matrix of bytes as Δ, Á ij represents the element at row i and column j.
As shown in Fig. 2 . Once there is any nonzero element among Δ, the value of nonzero element will be diffused to the row and column of the element after the operation of diffusion function DðÞ.
However, due to the diffusion function DðÞ is a single map function, it couldn't resist single byte fault attacks. Because if DðÞ is a single map function, that is, the value of DðÞ is fixed, so the attacker could enumerate the 2 8 different diffusion results when single byte error occur, then use the idea of DFA [1] to analyze these 256 different diffusion conditions to break the keys.
Based on the reason above, we design a randomized diffusion function. Our diffusion function Γ is described as the expression (2).
Among (2), M represents a 4 Â 4 random number matrix, which is generated by a random number generator, and M ≠ 0. The resulting Γ is the result of diffusion.
and as M is a random variable, so the value of Γ is random.
The description of proposed random infection countermeasure
According to the formula (1) and (2), this paper proposes a random infection mechanism. The detailed description of our countermeasure is as shown in Table I .
The whole process for the algorithm: firstly, checks whether there is an error occurred during the encryption or decryption process, i.e. whether ÁðÁ ¼ S 1 È S 2 Þ is zero, if Á ≠ 0, indicates there is occur faults in the encryption or decryption process, and then the diffusion function will infect the error to the other bytes, and infects the faults to S. Finally, outputs random faulty ciphertext C; If Á ¼ 0, the infection mechanism will be out of action, at last, outputs the right ciphertext C.
Experiments and results
In this section, we carry out several experiments to verify the effectiveness of our random infection mechanism. Without loss of generality, we assume injecting error occurred in encryption path. As shown in Fig. 1 , the exact location of the faults occurred is after the Rd9 and before the Rd10 of SB, denoted as S 9 .
Taking the first byte of the intermediate State after the completion of the Rd9 for example, we assume just only one bit fault being injected. The experimental process is shown in Table II .
In Table II, M (1) Á ðS 1 È S 2 Þ.
(2) À M Á DðÁÞ.
(3) S ðS È ÀÞ.
Fig. 2. The diffusion effect of diffusion function DðÞ
We can see from Table II: (1) when the faults are injected, À ≠ 0, this shows that the infection mechanism proposed effectively plays the role of fault diffusion, and the attacker could not bypass our infection mechanism. (2) Although plaintext P, key K and the fault injected are the same, the results of output ciphertext C are different. (3) Further, the results of output ciphertext C are uncertain and random, so our diffusion function has randomness characteristic, therefore can resist single byte error attacks.
Conclusion
In order to prevent the attackers from using faulty ciphertexts to attack the AES cipher circuit, this paper first analyzes the flawed of the existing faults attack countermeasures and proposes a new infection mechanism called random infection mechanism, which using the encryption/decryption circuit to construct the fault diffusion pattern and applying the random number to make the fault diffusion random so as to resist single byte fault enumerate attack. The experimental results show the AES circuit which using the scheme proposed in this paper can resist fault attacks effectively including single byte error attacks.
